NATO Eastward Enlargement:
Case for a Cautious but Persistent Approach
Donald K. Bandler & Jakub Kulhanek
Georgia and Ukraine stand at an important crossroads. The importance of these countries is underscored by their location in the vital geopolitical region of the Black Sea. The events of last August in Georgia, coupled with growing enlargement fatigue in Brussels, put a brake on these countriesÕ NATO membership aspirations. As we argue on the following pages, Washington needs to be steadfast and persistent in managing NATOÕs relationships with Georgia and Ukraine. We recommend a three–pronged approach: first, we need to caution Kyiv and Tbilisi that entry into the Alliance may well take a decade, if not more, to achieve; second, we need to promote democratic reforms and more importantly military reform so these countries will one day be ready and genuinely suited to join NATO; and third, perhaps most important, we advocate a robust engagement with Moscow offering credible prospects of NATO membership for Russia.
The events of last August in Georgia, which led to a full-blown military conflict with Russia, once again drew our attention to the vitally important Black Sea area, which constitutes an important transport corridor linking Europe and Asia. In addition to its close proximity to the Middle East and other hotspots, the Black Sea region becomes a crucial staging ground for our efforts to defuse future potential crises. Nevertheless, most of the Black Sea countries remain in a permanent state of flux - which was well illustrated by the war between Georgia and Russia last year.
These developments in Georgia remind us of another trouble-ridden country in the region, Ukraine. Both Georgia and Ukraine have in common their pervasive internal political instability, marked by seemingly never-ending squabbles between the government and the opposition. Given their location, moreover, they have to face unfavorable external realities. Lying on geopolitical fault lines, their domestic predicaments become even more precarious in light of challenges coming from abroad. An enlarging NATO and a newly assertive Russia have created a geopolitical twilight zone that spans vast swaths of the Black Sea region including Ukraine and Georgia. In the hope of mitigating these foreign policy challenges, the government in Tbilisi, and Kyiv to a lesser extent, have decided to pursue their integration into NATO.
NATOÕs April summit in Strasbourg and Kehl was a rather somber event to watch as the twenty seven member states celebrated the AllianceÕs 60th anniversary. Almost twenty years have passed since the end of the Cold War, and NATO still struggles to define its new purposes and roles. In fact, not invited to attend the summit at all, bar the representatives of Croatia and Albania, the mood among candidate and partner countries was even gloomier. With the shadow of the war in Georgian looming ominously during the two day summit, it was obvious to even the most enthusiastic proponents of further NATO expansion that enlargement fatigue had arrived.
This did not bode well for Kyiv and Tbilisi, both of whom aspire to join the Alliance. Although the public diplomacy teams were cautious to admit it publicly, further eastward enlargement was effectively put on hold in all but name. Thus, the message conveyed by the heads of states of NATO countries at the summit was unequivocally clear, i.e. neither Georgia nor Ukraine can expect NATO membership any time soon.
Today, the Alliance finds itself in a precarious situation over how to handle effectively the membership aspirations of Ukraine and Georgia -- supported by the US and some new member states, while opposed by others such as Germany and probably France as well. Moreover, talk of the possible inclusion of either Ukraine or Georgia in NATO has already threatened to drive a wedge between NATO members. Should Washington press ahead with a campaign aimed at expediting this next tranche of NATO enlargement, the Obama administration could risk an internal split within the alliance. Provided that Tbilisi and/or Kyiv does obtains its goal of fast-track membership, however, MoscowÕs erratic opposition to NATO enlargement is only likely to intensify. Tackling these issues, it will require US stewardship, focused consultations with our allies, and fashioning an outcome that preserves NATOÕs internal cohesion and avoids disappointing the candidate countries and their champions.
UkraineÕs future is a key in European security. The transatlantic relationship will either benefit from a stable Ukraine or fall prey to a Ukraine wrestling in the thrall of perpetual political and economic crises that threaten to spill over into central and eastern Europe. In other words, it is correct to assume that a democratic and prosperous Ukraine can become a powerful magnet for Russia to induce it to follow in its neighborÕs steps. Should Ukraine, on the other hand, become a failed state, whose weakness Russia might be tempted to exploit to its own advantage, this would only nurture neo-imperial tendencies among the Russian elites -- with repercussions far beyond the post-Soviet space.
As far as NATO is concerned, Ukraine has a lot to offer, and significant potential economic and political benefits from closer cooperation with the NATO Alliance. Ukrainian troops have served in the Balkans, Iraq and Afghanistan. Ukrainian transport aircraft, such as giant Soviet-built An-225 planes, could provide a welcome boost to NATOÕs insufficient transport fleet while the US and our European allies are having difficulty keeping up with their defense industrial commitments.
Moreover, the Ukrainian army is suffering from an ever shrinking budget, is still trying to cope with its difficult Soviet legacy and remains enmeshed in cross-cutting political and military currents that seem to be in a state of permanent disarray. Although the collapse of the Soviet Union left on Ukrainian territory some of the best fighting units in the Soviet Army, there was no separate command and control infrastructure in place to support an independent national army. Ever since, the Ukrainian government has had a difficult time trimming down and rationalizing its cumbersome military, while trying to bring it on par with Western militaries. However dire the situation in the Ukrainian army may be, the current situation presents an opportunity for cooperation between NATO and Ukraine. The former might assist Kyiv in building leaner, more integrated and more affordable defense capabilities. The experience of newly admitted Central and Eastern European countries in NATO may prove instrumental in helping Ukrainians to succeed in this endeavor.
As far as UkraineÕs domestic debate is concerned, however, the question of NATO membership presents a politically explosive issue. Support for UkraineÕs NATO membership is found mainly in the western part of the country and among the political elites around President Victor Yushchenko. In contrast, the rest of the country is generally mistrustful of NATO. That is partially due to the lack of credible information available to ordinary Ukrainians, who continue to see the Alliance through a cold war prism. Public opinion polls show that the greatest opposition among the Russian-speaking majority is in eastern and southern Ukraine, as well as in the Crimea. Although Kyiv is eager to obtain its invitation to join the Alliance, Ukrainian leaders have agreed that the country would only become a full NATO member if a nationwide referendum backed such a step.
Given the current circumstances, any hasty move towards NATO is likely to generate a backlash from the opposition Party of Regions led by a former prime minister, Victor Yanukovich. We are concerned that rapid NATO accession for Ukraine might further undermine existing and potential support for pro-Western policies among the Ukrainians. At first blush, UkraineÕs population of 40 million seems to be bitterly divided between their pro-Western and pro-Russian allegiances. Despite their conflicting affinities, however, Ukrainians by-and-large agree on the need to preserve their countryÕs unity. This sentiment is also shared among Ukrainian elites. Consequently, a scenario of Ukraine falling apart should be ruled out – notwithstanding alarmist claims to the contrary, and despite visible tensions between the eastern and western parts of the country. Indeed, this offers us at least some comfort that Washington has the possibility to proceed in a measured approach, without feeling the need to press for a politically expedient approach.
Given the current political paralysis in Ukraine, Washington should not push for a rash decision regarding NATO enlargement. To the contrary, however, it is time to seize the moment and present a realistic blueprint for KyivÕs partnership with the Alliance. At least in the short run, NATO should focus primarily on providing technical and expert assistance to the Ukrainian armed forces. Before joining the Alliance, Ukraine will have to put a lot of effort into restructuring its military to make it compatible with NATO standards. At the political level, since granting Ukraine a Membership Action Plan (MAP) is out of question at this stage, we should try to make the most of the NATO-Ukraine Commission as a primary venue for conducting political dialogue between Kyiv and Brussels. The Commission that was established in 1997 can in many respects be utilized to emphasize its elevated status and a high level approach to bilateral cooperation. Furthermore, Ukraine should make maximum use of the NATO-Ukraine Action Plan. This is a key to advancing the major overhaul of its security and defense sector with assistance from the Allies as provided for in this plan. For NATO, the action plan offers an effective means of encouraging Kyiv, as well as ensuring fulfills its part of the bargain. Finally, Washington should demand strict compliance with the 1994 Trilateral Statement signed by representatives of the US, Russia and Ukraine, whereby the signatories pledged to preserve UkraineÕs territorial integrity.
Following the August War, Georgia has fallen into a geopolitical trap, and there seems to be no easy way out. Moreover, the one-sided rosy view of Georgian democracy has gradually given way to a more realistic assessment of the real state of Georgian democracy. Although the Rose Revolution that, swept a western-leaning President Mikheil Saakashvili to power resulted in many positive changes in the Georgian society, there is still much to be desired. In fact, some of the most disturbing trends -- lack of media freedom, occasional crackdowns on opposition political parties, and endemic corruption -- are still very much a part of GeorgiaÕs day-to-day life. The US and NATO can not turn our backs on these worrying developments. It is no wonder that corruption often becomes a welcome tool in the hands of detractors of the West for its alleged double-standards.
Since Georgia seeks its integration into the West, in general, and NATO, in particular, we have to insist on upholding key democratic principles and values that the Western countries cherish.
That said, the most salient issue in our dealings with Georgia remains Russia. It is apparent that there is no love lost between the two governments, which amounts to a potentially explosive mix. Some cognoscenti argue that support from the US - and the prospects of NATO membership - might in fact have emboldened GeorgiaÕs President to pursue an even more assertive policy towards Russia.
The opponents of Georgian membership maintain that the Alliance might be dragged into an unprovoked conflict with Russia in the future. Certainly, this is not to say that the US and our allies should bow to RussiaÕs pressure; however, our allies and we need to make sure that NATO membership is beneficial both to Georgia and NATO. Unlike that of Ukraine, the Georgian population is overwhelmingly in favor of joining the NATO alliance. It has actively participated in NATO peacekeeping missions as well as Operation Iraqi Freedom, and this should be recognized. Given the current circumstances and our broader international interests in and out of the region, a prudent approach is indicated. The Obama administration is well advised to undertake an interagency review of the key issues at stake. Given the current circumstances, we can go only so far.
The biggest obstacle to GeorgiaÕs entry into NATO was only made more intractable after the August War and its territorial fragmentation. The breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, both of whose independence is now recognized by Moscow, creates a Catch-22 predicament. The Georgian government is aware that all of its existing territorial disputes must first be resolved. At the same time, it remains determined to re-acquire its lost provinces and to become a much-coveted member of the NATO alliance. Thus, any potential attempt to annex these separatist territories would inevitably lead to another disastrous war with Russia.
The limited room for maneuver that Tbilisi has gives Russia unprecedented geopolitical leverage over its southern neighbor. Although we should not give in to the whims of Moscow, NATO needs to face reality on the ground. Georgia is distancing itself from NATO rather than the other way around. Reversing this trend appears to be a long and potentially perilous process.
Our immediate objective has to be to promote reconciliation between Georgia and Russia. Given its geographic proximity to Russia, Georgia appears to have no other option than to find an accommodation of some sort with Moscow. This will no doubt be a long-term undertaking. The United States and the European Union should encourage both parties to discuss their differences. In the meantime, we should continue our assistance to Georgia, through both multilateral and bilateral initiatives. With respect to NATO, Georgia should be encouraged to increase its cooperation, but as we argue in regard to the case of Ukraine, this assistance and cooperation should be limited mostly to technical assistance -- at least in the foreseeable future. To that end, the NATO-Georgian Commission should become a focal point of our activities. To RussiaÕs chagrin, the commission was established in the wake of the war in Georgia to express sympathy and boost mutual cooperation. We should insist on utilizing this body not only to reaffirm our unwavering commitment to practical cooperation with Georgia, but also to better coordinate existing partnership initiatives. That said, Georgia should not be under the impression that its participation in the commission is a short-cut to the membership.
It is our firm belief that NATO in advancing its post-cold war enlargement has failed to sufficiently address key concerns of those countries sandwiched between the Alliance members and Russia. Considering that the main rationale behind continuing NATO enlargement is to promote stability in Europe, we argue that it is imperative for the Alliance to implement a new set of policies to stabilize its volatile eastern flank.
The time is ripe for outside the box thinking. Washington should craft its foreign policy approaches to reach out not only to prospective membership hopefuls but to Russia as well. To that end, we advocate a three-pronged approach. First, we need to caution expectations in Kyiv and Tbilisi for an early entry into the Alliance. Instead, we emphasize that the accession process will be long and demanding. Both countries need to commit themselves to profound military and democratic reforms along the way. In that respect, compromises are not permissible.
Second, in order to avoid the deviation from their pro-reform course, NATO as a whole -- as well as individual member states -- should make every effort possible to reaffirm their commitments to helping Ukraine and Georgia on their path to NATO membership.
Third, we need to engineer a robust engagement with Russia in this respect. Washington should keep reiterating that Moscow is part of the solution, not part of the problem, and as such it needs to be made an active participant in bringing stability into the Black Sea area. Similarly, Russia needs to be constantly reminded that this process is not in any way aimed at compromising its national interests. One way of achieving a more cooperative relationship with Russia in this regard is to emphasize that Moscow is welcome to join NATO as long as it wishes, and is ready to fulfill all the relevant criteria expected of Georgia and Ukraine. It has to be clear that double standards are out of bounds. Russia has long complained about NATO keeping it at armÕs length and that Brussels still harbors anti-Russian sentiments. We need to demonstrate that this is not the case, and that we are open to all forms of cooperation as long as Moscow is willing to follow clearly delineated and mutually acceptable rules. Devising such an innovative approach in our dealings with Russia will in our view prove to be the most difficult but also the most promising approach to securing our long term geopolitical objectives.
At the same time, however, Washington and our allies will have to make it clear to the Russian leadership that undue pressure on the governments of Georgia and Ukraine will not be tolerated. To this end, occasional joint naval and peacekeeping exercises in the Black Sea will send an unequivocal message about our resolve. In the meantime, we need to provide support economic and military assistance to both countries and encourage the European Union to reach out more to Kyiv and Tbilisi.
Last but not least, we need to consider the implications of further enlargement for the decision making processes inside the Alliance. NATOÕs 28 members operate on the basis of consensus, and they are finding it increasingly difficult to act effectively. In other words, the more members NATO invites, the more urgent reform and increased efficiencies become. The Alliance should have a genuine debate on potential changes to its internal decision-making mechanisms. Such an overhaul is long overdue, and it should be addressed before further enlargement moves are undertaken.